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Abstract: Today’s distributed network control planes
support multiple routing protocols, filtering mechanisms,
and route selection policies. These protocols operate
at different layers, e.g. BGP operates at the EGP layer,
OSPF at the IGP layer, and VLANs at layer 2. The be-
havior of a network’s control plane depends on how these
protocols interact with each other. This makes network
configurations highly complex and error-prone. State-of-
the-art control plane verifiers are either too slow, or do
not model certain features of the network. In this paper,
we propose a new multilayer hedge graph abstraction,
Tiramisu, that supports fast verification of the control
plane. Tiramisu uses a combination of graph traversal
algorithms and ILPs (Integer Linear Programs) to check
different network policies. We use Tiramisu to verify
policies of various real-world and synthetic configura-
tions. Our experiments show that Tiramisu can verify
any policy in < 0.08 s in small networks (∼35 devices)
and < 0.12 s in large networks (∼160 devices), and it
is 10-600X faster than state-of-the-art without losing
generality.
1 Introduction and Background
Many networks, including university, enterprise, ISP and
data center networks, employ complex distributed control
planes running atop rich underlying network structures.
The control planes run a variety of routing protocols, such
as RIP, OSPF, and BGP, which are configured in intricate
ways to exchange routing information both within and
across protocols. In some cases, the protocols are assisted
by other protocols (e.g., iBGP assisting in distributing
BGP information throughout a network). Networks also
employ techniques to virtualize the control plane, such
as virtual routing and forwarding (VRF), as well as tech-
niques to virtualize multiple network links into different
broadcast domains (VLANs).
Bugs can easily creep into such networks, e.g., through
errors in the detailed configurations that many of the
protocols need. Often, bugs may not be immediately
apparent, and the network may be running “just fine” un-
til a failure causes a latent bug to be triggered. When
bugs do manifest, a variety of catastrophic outcomes can
arise: the network may suffer from blackholes; services
with restricted access may be rendered wide open; crit-
ical applications can no longer be isolated from other
services/applications, and so on.
Verification tools and their trade-offs. A variety of
tools attempt to verify if networks are violating, or could
potentially violate, policies of the above kind. Data plane
verifiers [13, 10, 11] analyze the current forwarding ta-
bles and check for blackholes, loops, or broken path iso-
lation. Unfortunately, these tools don’t have the means to
analyze if the network’s new data plane that materialized
upon reacting to a failure, can satisfy relevant policies or
not.
To overcome this issue, a variety of control plane ana-
lyzers were developed [5, 2, 16, 4, 6]. These proactively
analyze the network against various environments, e.g.,
failures or external advertisements. While a significant
step forward in network verification, control plane tools
today make trade-offs between performance and general-
ity.
On the one hand are “graph-based” tools such as
ARC [6]. ARC encodes all paths that may manifest in a
network under various failures into a series of weighted
digraphs. This abstraction enables analyzing the network
under many potential environments at once by running
very fast polynomial time graph algorithms; e.g., check-
ing if two hosts are always blocked amounts to check-
ing if they are in different graph connected components.
Unfortunately, ARC ignores many network design con-
structs, including modeling the intricacies of BGP and
iBGP, and the existence of VLANs, and VRFs.
On the other hand are “SMT-based” tools such as Bag-
pipe [16] and Minesweeper [2]. These tools create a
detailed model of the control plane by symbolically en-
coding routing information exchange, route selection
logic, and the environment (e.g., failures) using logical
constraints/variables. By asking for a satisfying assign-
ment for a SMT formula that encodes the network and
the property of interest, they can identify a concrete en-
vironment that leads to property violation. These tools
offer much better coverage of control plane protocols
than graph-based ones, but their verification performance
is very poor, especially when exploring failures (§6),
despite many internal SMT-specific optimizations.
Decoupling encoding and properties. We ask if it
is possible to design a verification tool that marries the
speed of graphs with the generality of an SMT-based
encoding.
We start by noting that today the trade-off between per-
formance and generality in tools, arises from a coupling
between the control plane encoding used in the tools and
how properties are verified. In graph-based tools, the
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weighted graph control plane model requires graph al-
gorithms to verify properties. In SMT-based tools, the
detailed constraint-based control plane encoding requires
a general constraint solver to be used for all properties.
Our framework, Tiramisu, decouples the encoding
from the property: it uses a sufficiently rich encoding for
the network that models various control plane features
and network design constructs. But then, it permits the
use of custom algorithms that offer the best performance
to verify a property of interest.
Richer graphs. Our framework starts with graphs as
the basis for modeling networks, because graph-based
control plane analysis has been shown to be fast [6].
We then embellish the graph model with richer graph
constructs, such as hierarchical layering, the notion of
hedges [7] (edges that fail together), and rich, multi-
attribute edge and node labels. Our resulting graph can
model all aspects we observe used in real world networks
and configurations.
Given the graph structure, we then develop a suite of
custom techniques that help verify various properties of
interest.
Avoiding path enumeration. First, we note that some
properties of interest do not require the computation of
the actual path that the network would induce on a certain
failure; they care mostly about whether paths exist or not.
An example is whether two hosts are always blocked
from each other. For such properties, we develop two
techniques that avoid path enumeration altogether: a
modified depth first search graph traversal algorithm, and
a simple integer linear program (ILP) formulation that
computes graph cuts. Importantly, graph traversal runs
in polynomial time. And, for a given property, the sim-
plified property-specific ILP can be solved much faster
than a general SMT-encoding in SMT-based tools. This
is because the former explores symbolically only the
variables that are relevant to the property being veri-
fied, whereas the SMT solver for the general encoding
searches through a much larger search space.
Domain-specific path computation. For the remain-
ing properties that require computation of paths, we run
a modified path vector protocol atop our richer graph ab-
straction. Here, we leverage foundational work by Griffin
et. al which showed that various routing protocols can be
modeled as instances of the stable paths problem [8] (this
insight was used in Minesweeper), and that a “simple
path vector protocol” (SPVP) [8] emulates the compu-
tation of a solution to this problem. In our version of
SPVP, each node consumes the multi-dimensional at-
tributes of incoming edges and neighboring vertices, and
uses simple arithmetic operations that encode existing
protocols’ logic to select among multiple paths available
at the moment. Importantly, in simple networks (e.g.,
those that use a single routing protocol) our protocol
naturally devolves to being similar to distance vector
protocol, which runs in polynomial time (being based
on the Bellman-Ford algorithm). For more general net-
works, we empirically find that our protocol can quickly
compute the paths that are relevant to verifying specific
properties. The performance is faster than SMT-based
tools, because our approach essentially uses a highly
domain-specific approach to finding paths, compared to
a SMT-based general search strategy; for instance, even
for simple networks, a SMT-based strategy would invoke
the solver to find a satisfying assignment.
Prototype and evaluation. We implemented
Tiramisu in Java (7K LOC) and evaluated it with many
real data center and university networks, as well as
networks from the topology zoo [12]. We find that
Tiramisu’s rich multi-layered graphs can be computed
from configurations in a few µs per traffic class. Using
Tiramisu’s custom algorithms, various properties can be
checked for complex networks in 3-80ms per traffic class.
Compared to Minesweeper that uses a general encod-
ing with an SMT solver, Tiramisu offers speed of up to
600X for reachability policy verification and 10-50X for
bounded-length and path preference policies (both under
failures). Tiramisu’s algorithmic approach renders it sub-
stantially faster even when verifying properties under no
failures. Finally, Tiramisu scales well, providing verifi-
cation results in ∼100ms per traffic class for networks
with ∼160 routers.
2 Motivation
Given the significant performance benefits of graph ab-
stractions [6], we use graphs as the basis to encode con-
trol plane computation in Tiramisu. However, the ab-
straction we use is significantly different from ARC [6].
In what follows, we provide an overview of ARC’s graph
based approach for verification. We then identify its key
drawbacks which motivate Tiramisu’s graph design.
2.1 ARC
ARC (Abstract representation for control plane [6]) is
a state-of-the-art control plane verifier. It models a net-
work’s control plane using a collection of directed graphs.
There is one directed graph per traffic class which models
the forwarding behavior of packets belonging to that traf-
fic class. In ARC, nodes represent routing processes, and
directed edges represent possible flow of traffic enabled
by exchange of route advertisements between routing
processes. Using a single attribute edge-weight, ARC
can model OSPF costs and AS path length. Finally, ARC
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Policy class Graph characteristics
P1: src and dst are always
block
src and dst are in separate compo-
nents
P2: All paths from src to dst
traverses a waypoint
after removing the waypoint, src
and dst are in separate components
P3: src can reach dst when
there are < K link failures
min-cut of src−dst graph is >= K
Table 1: Policies as graph characteristics
B
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Figure 1: Multilayer dependency
verifies policies by checking some simple graph charac-
teristics. Table 1 lists some of these policies and related
graph properties. By leveraging graphs, ARC offers
order-of-magnitude better performance [6] compared to
state-of-the-art [5, 2].
However, ARC’s drawback is that it is limited in its
network design coverage. It does not model layer 3
protocols such as iBGP and VRF. It does not model any
layer 2 protocols including VLANs. It also does not
model BGP protocol attributes such as local preference,
communities etc. We use examples to show how these
limitations can affect ARC’s correctness, and what we
do in Tiramisu to overcome them.
Cross layer dependency. Consider the network
in Figure 1. The network consists of 5 routers (A−E).
Here, routers A and B are eBGP peers of router E, and,
router C is an iBGP peer of router B. All routers except E
belong to the same OSPF process, with each link except
C−D having a link cost of 1. Link C−D has cost 5.
In this scenario, C learns a route to E through its iBGP
neighbor B, with B as its next hop. C forwards all traffic
destined to E, to B. iBGP peers forward traffic at the IGP
layer. Hence C uses its OSPF process to find the path to
reach B. The path computed varies for different failure
scenarios, which affects reachability of traffic. Depend-
ing on the path used under a given failure, the operator’s
policy for traffic between C and E may be violated:
i) Under no failures, OSPF prefers path C→ B (OSPF
cost 1), and then traffic flows from B→ E;
ii) When the link B→C fails, OSPF prefers a different
path C→ A→D→ B (cost 3). Crucially, traffic at A gets
directly rerouted to E, because A is the eBGP peer of E;
A eBGP S1 CeBGP
D eBGP
E eBGP
B
eBGP
OSPF
vlan2 vlan1
block
comm
c1
remove 
comm
c1
add comm
c1
ospf = 1
lp = 100
lp = 
50
OSPF
T
S
U
Figure 2: Multiple network features
iii) When links A→ C and B→ C fail, OSPF prefers
path C→D→ B (cost 6). Here traffic gets dropped at D,
because D did not learn a route for E, and C is discon-
nected from A. Note that, had router A or B redistributed
it’s BGP routes to OSPF , then D would have learned a
route to E, avoiding the blackhole situation (iii) above.
Such dependencies between iBGP and OSPF cannot
be modeled in ARC. ARC cannot analyze these scenarios
and compute the actual paths used, and because of it, it
cannot be used to verify any policies in this network.
ARC’s lack of modeling of cross-layer dependencies
impacts its applicability in other network scenarios too.
Consider the network in Figure 2. This network has 5
routers (A−E), a switch S1, and three hosts S−U . All
routers run BGP, and routers B and E also run OSPF
(with cost 1). Switch S1 connects to router C and A on
VLAN 1 and 2, respectively. D adds community “c1”
to its advertisements, A removes “c1”, and E blocks all
advertisements with community “c1”. Finally, to prefer
routes learned from B over A, E assigns local preference
values 100 and 50 to B and A, respectively.
Although routers A and C are connected to the same
switch S1, they belong to different VLANs. Hence, traf-
fic cannot flow through switch S1. By default, ARC
assumes layer 2 connectivity. Hence according to ARC
routers A and C are reachable and traffic can flow be-
tween them.
The overall theme is that protocols “depend” on each
other. E.g. iBGP depends on OSPF, BGP and OSPF
depend on VLANs etc. These protocols also operate at
different “layers”. BGP operates at the EGP (Exterior
Gateway Protocol) layer, OSPF at the IGP (Interior Gate-
way protocol) layer, and VLANs at Layer 2. A graph
abstraction needs to encode layers and cross-layer de-
pendencies. Thus, Tiramisu introduces a new multilayer
graph abstraction, where traffic flow in the higher lay-
ers may depend on the traffic flow in the lower layers.
Figure 3 and 4 show the multilayer graphs of the afore-
mentioned networks, which we explain in detail in §3
Impact of BGP attributes. In Figure 2, the path
taken from E to C depends on communities and lo-
cal preference. There are two paths from E to C: i)
E → B→ D→ C, and, ii) E → A→ D→ C. Because
of local preference, path (i) is preferred over path (ii).
However, E blocks all advertisements with community
“c1”. Since router D adds this community, all advertise-
ments through D will have community “c1”. Hence the
advertisement for path (i) is blocked. Although the ad-
vertisement for path (ii) also comes through D, router A
removes community “c1” and router E does not see that
community. Therefore, there is only one path between
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Abgp
EGP layer
IGP layer
ebgp
ospf
ibgp
fib
physical
Ebgp Bbgp Cbgp
Efib Bfib Cfib
Afib Dfib
Bospf CospfAospf Dospf
Figure 3: Correlated Edges
Dbgp
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T
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Layer 2
<ad=20, 
as = 1, lp = 50>
add c1
remove 
c1
block c1
<ad = 20, 
as = 1>
<ad= 110, ospf= 1>
Efib Bfib Afib Dfib Cfib
Note: In this example, edge metrics 
are same in both direction
Figure 4: Multilayer Hedge Graph for traffic class S−T
E and C: E → A→ D→ C. ARC, on the other hand,
characterizes path (i) as valid.
Additionally, ARC cannot model other BGP attributes
like local preference, MED etc. To support all BGP at-
tributes as well as metrics of other protocols (OSPF cost,
AD), Tiramisu uses multiple edge and node attributes.
We elaborate in §3.
Physical link dependency. Consider the network
in Figure 2 without link A− E. Here, according to
ARC, traffic from S to U can flow through 2 paths
S→ Eosp f → Bosp f → U and S→ Ebgp → Bbgp → U .
To evaluate reachability under failure, ARC calculates
min-cut of this graph as 2, and concludes that it can with-
stand arbitrary 1 link failures. However, this is incorrect
because edgeEosp f→Bosp f and edgeEbgp→Bbgp belong to the
same underlying physical link E−B whose failure causes
disconnection.
In graphs, the notion of hedges [7] can be used to
model such dependency among edges. A hedge is a set
of edges that fail together. A graph can have multiple
hedges, each with more than one edge in it, and a single
edge can belong to multiple hedges. In Tiramisu, to
support edges that fail together, we label sets of “related”
edges as hedges. Overall, Tiramisu converts the control
plane into a series of multilayer multi-attribute hedge
graphs one per source-destination pair.
3 Tiramisu Graph Abstraction
We discuss the components of the Tiramisu graph ab-
straction.
Nodes. In Tiramisu, nodes are created for both
switches and routers. For switches, nodes are created per
device, per VLAN. E.g, in Figure 4, S2 has two nodes
S2v1 and S2v2 for VLANs 1 and 2. For routers, nodes
are created per device, per routing process. E.g, in Fig-
ure 4, router B has two nodes Bbgp and Bosp f for it’s BGP
and OSPF routing processes. If the router supports VRF
(Virtual Routing and Forwarding), then the nodes are
replicated per device, per virtual routing process (sim-
ilar to VLAN). Note that by default, each routing pro-
cess has a default vrf, and nodes like Bbgp represent the
default vrf of B’s BGP process. We identify routing
processes, VLANs, and VRFs from device configura-
tions. We also create, per router, a node representing the
router’s forwarding information base (FIB). Finally, we
create two special nodes representing the src and dst of
a traffic class.
Edges. Tiramisu categorizes it’s edges into multiple
labels, depending on the edge’s end nodes. These labels
include: FIB (f), eBGP (b), IGP (o), static (s), redistribute
(r), iBGP (i), and physical (p). Some of these labels are
for inter-device edges and some for intra-device edges.
We show examples of these labels in Figure 4, and ex-
plain them below.
Inter device edges. An inter-device edge exists be-
tween different devices that have a physical link connect-
ing them. There are three cases: (i) if both end nodes are
switches and belong to the same VLAN, connect them
with an edge of label “p”, (ii) if one node is a switch
and other a router, connect them with edge of label “p”,
e.g. edgeS1v1→Abgp . (iii) if both nodes are routers, they
belong to the same routing process (IGP or eBGP) and
the same VRF, then connect them with edge label “o” or
“b”, respectively, e.g. edgeDbgp→Abgp .
Intra device edges. An intra-device edge exists be-
tween nodes that belong to the same device. There are
three cases: (i) if the router redistributes routes from
process X to Y , add edge of label “r” from Y to X , e.g.
edgeBbgp→Bosp f , (ii) if the router is an iBGP peer, add
edge of label “i” from the router’s BGP process to the
underlying IGP process, e.g. edgeBbgp→Bosp f of Figure 3,
or (iii) every node corresponding to a routing process on
a given router is connected (both ways) to the router’s
FIB node; e.g., Bosp f is connected to B f ib (Figure 3).
Each traffic class has a srcRouter and dstRouter that
originate the src and dst IP addresses. Tiramisu connects
the src node to all routing processes of srcRouter. Fi-
nally, it connects all routing processes of dstRouter with
dst node.
Edge costs. Tiramisu supports multiple routing pro-
tocols. Each protocol uses a different set of metrics to
express link and path costs/preferences. E.g. OSPF uses
link costs, and, BGP uses AS-path length, local prefer-
ence (lp), Multi-Exit Descriptor (MED) etc. Addition-
ally, an administrative distance (AD), allows operators
to choose routes from different protocols. Hence a sin-
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gle edge weight cannot model all protocols. Tiramisu
replaces these edge weights with a vector of metrics. The
values of these metrics are inferred from device config-
urations. Depending on the edge label, certain metrics
will be set as null, e.g. OSPF cost is null for “b” edges.
Hedges. All edges that represent the same physi-
cal link belong to the same hedge. E.g. in Figure 4,
edgeBbgp→Ebgp and edgeBosp f→Eosp f belong to the same
physical link B→ E, and thus the same hedge.
Traffic class specific constructs.: Some aspects of
the network are specific to traffic classes, e.g. ACLs,
filters, static routes, etc. Thus, Tiramisu first creates a
single base graph representing the above features/pro-
tocols for the entire network. From that, it then creates
traffic class-specific graphs.
ACLs prevent specific traffic classes from enter-
ing/leaving a router, and filters block advertising specific
prefixes. Thus, for a given traffic class, Tiramisu logi-
cally removes an edge of the traffic class graph if there is
(i) an ACL that blocks this traffic class on the interface
associated with this edge, or, (ii) a filter that blocks this
traffic class’s destination prefix on the routing process
associated with the start node of this edge.
Static routes are also traffic class specific. Tiramisu
adds an edges of label “s” from the node representing the
source of the static route process to all nodes associated
with the next hop router, for the relevant traffic class.
Node communities. Communities are also a traffic
class specific construct. In Tiramisu, each node rep-
resenting a BGP process has three sets of communi-
ties: “ac” - communities added by the node, “rc” com-
munities removed by the node, and “mc” communities
matched/acted upon by the node. The action associated
with each “mc” is to either block traffic or change edge
metrics like local preference and MED.
3.1 Prohibited paths
All the algorithms we present to verify various proper-
ties rely on examining properties of source-destination
paths in the above graph abstraction. In designing these
algorithms care must be taken to avoid certain paths that
cannot materialize in a real network under any failure.
This mainly arises due to constraints on interactions be-
tween routing protocols and route redistributions/static
routes, and due to communities. We show how we reason
about which routes cannot be taken due to the former
reason. We handle communities later.
For example, as shown in §2, traffic crossing from an
EGP to the IGP layer gets dropped if the intermediate
nodes at the IGP layer do not learn/have a route to dst.
Intuitively, a path can materialize in the network if
there is relevant forwarding information available toward
the destination in the RIB of some routing process run-
ning on each router on the path, and thus in the router’s
FIB; this observation forms the basis for the seminal
work on static reachability analysis of IP networks [17].
A path cannot materialize if it includes a router with no
forwarding information for the destination. To keep track
of such disallowed paths for graph traversal or when com-
puting paths taken, Tiramisu uses a “tainting” strategy.
In a preprocessing step, taints track how forwarding in-
formation may flow through a network’s RIBs and may
populate FIBs. Taint on a node implies that a node may
know of a route to a destination; lack of a taint implies
the node will not know of any route.
For each traffic class, taints propagate in the corre-
sponding Tiramisu graph starting at the destination dst;
the routing process connected to the dst is tainted, as are
all other peer processes of the same routing protocol in-
stance on other routers. Taints flow across redistribution
and static route edges, and spread throughout the vertices
corresponding to a single IGP. Taints also propagate from
one iBGP peer to another (because iBGP peers learn of
routes from each other).
Specifically, to identify nodes in the IGP layer that
have a route to dst, Tiramisu first finds the node at the
EGP layer that redistributes its route to IGP, and taints
this node.1 Next, Tiramisu marks all nodes in the IGP
process’s layer as tainted, implying that they may know
of a route to dst in their RIB due to redistribution from
the EGP (recall: IGPs flood learned routes, to routers in
the same IGP process). On the other hand, if there is no
redistribution from EGP into IGP, the corresponding IGP
node is marked as untainted, because it will not not have
a route to the destination in its RIB (but a route may exist
in the router’s FIB because the EGP process computed
a route); all other nodes in the same IGP process are
also untainted. E.g. in Figure 3, all OSPF nodes are
untainted.
The above processes is applied to all routing layers
and EGP/IGP crossings, of which there may be many in
a network. In the end, we have a tainted graph, with a
subset of vertices carrying taints and others without taint;
the latter vertices will not have a forwarding entry to the
destination.
Given a tainted graph, we determine which paths are
disallowed. Intuitively, an untainted node must reside
on the same router as a tainted node for a path to the
destination to be found in the router’s FIB. Thus, a po-
tentially valid path has ≤ 2 consecutive untainted nodes
1Note, that edges in Tiramisu represent the flow of traffic and not
of advertisements. Hence, redistribution of EGP routes into IGP is
represented by an “r” edge from the IGP node to the EGP node.
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(e.g., the two IGP nodes). Any path with > 2 consec-
utive untainted nodes is an invalid or prohibited path.
E.g. in Figure 3, Cosp f → Dosp f → Aosp f is a subpath of
prohibited paths.
Although our example considered iBGP, IGP and BGP
interactions, taints can also be used to understand how
static routes can shape the flow of routing information,
and consequently impact paths.
Theorem 1 The above approach correctly identifies all
prohibited path.
We prove this by contradiction as shown in Ap-
pendix B.1.
A potentially valid path may still not materialize in
the network due communities. We handle communities
specially in our algorithms in subsequent sections.
4 Avoiding Path Enumeration
For many properties of interest, verifying them does not
actually require computation or enumeration of actual
paths that may arise in the network; rather, we simply
need to know of the existence of paths (possibly of a
certain kind). Knowing of the existence of paths is far
simpler than actually computing paths under a given
failure.
Thus, we design two sets of algorithms, one that tra-
verses a graph along all potential paths, and another that
uses ILPs to reason about the number of paths and high-
level path properties (maximum path length). We present
these algorithms in the context of the properties they aid
in the verification of. All algorithms use taints to take in-
valid paths out of consideration, and handle communities
specially as mentioned above.
4.1 Tiramisu Depth First Search
DFS (Depth First Search) is a graph traversal algorithm
that identifies all nodes that are reachable from a given
src. A node remains unvisited after DFS iff there exists
no path from src to that node. The DFS algorithm can
be naturally used to verify certain reachability policies,
such as, P1 (“always blocked”): P1 is true iff under
every failure scenario, there exists no path between src
and dst node. However standard DFS does not avoid
prohibited path constraints, nor does it account for how
BGP communities may shape the existence of paths. E.g.
in Figure 3, paths with subpath Cbgp→Cosp f → Bosp f →
Dosp f are prohibited. But DFS identifies them as valid.
We first assume no communities are in use and propose
a modified DFS algorithm (Algorithm 1) that avoids pro-
hibited paths, T DFS (Tiramisu DFS). We then account
for communities by invoking T DFS on carefully selected
subgraphs.
Algorithm 1 Tiramisu Depth First Search
Input:
G is the graph
src is the root node for depth first search
1: procedure initialize(G,src)
2: Set all nodes of G as unvisited
3: T DFS(G, src, 0)
Input:
u is current node being traversed
numUntaint tracks # consecutive untainted nodes
4: procedure T DFS(G, u, numUntaint)
5: Set node u as visited
6: for each e ∈ G.outgoingEdge[u] do
7: v← end node of edge e
8: Ignore v, if already visited
9: if v is untainted then
10: increment numUntaint by 1
11: Ignore v, if numUntaint is 3
12: else
13: numUntaint← 0
14: T DFS(G, v, numUntaint)
Like DFS, T DFS explores all unvisited outbound
neighbors of a node (line 6 to 8). However, it uses
an additional variable numUntaint to avoid traversing
prohibited paths.
In this algorithm, numUntaint represents the number
of consecutive untainted nodes seen by T DFS; T DFS
simply avoids all paths with more than 2 consecutive
untainted nodes (line 11). E.g., in Figure 4, when T DFS
reaches node Dosp f , numUntaint becomes 3 and T DFS
stops exploring this path. T DFS’s complexity is the same
as standard DFS.
T DFS algorithm does not handle communities. Nodes
may add communities to path advertisements that oth-
ers filter on. When such filtering happens, the corre-
sponding paths cannot be taken by network traffic. To
support communities, Tiramisu uses another simple algo-
rithm, commT DFS (Algorithm 2). commT DFS makes a
constant number of calls to T DFS verify P1. Thus, its
overall complexity is still polynomial-time.
As shown in §2, nodes can add, remove or block on
communities. In presence of such nodes, the order in
which these nodes are traversed in a path decides if dst
is reachable.
In the commT DFS algorithm, Tiramisu first checks
if src and dst are unreachable according to T DFS (line
5, 6). If they are reachable, then commT DFS checks
if all paths that connect src to dst has i) a node (say
X) that blocks on a community in an advertisement for
dst (line 8 to 10), ii) followed by a node (say Y) that
adds that community to an advertisement for dst (line
11 to 13), iii) and no node between them X and Y that
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Algorithm 2 Always blocked with communities
Input:
G is the graph
s and d are source and destination nodes
It uses T DFS to answer multiple (un)reachability
queries
1: procedure commTDFS(G,s,d)
2: cA← nodes that add community
3: cR← nodes that remove community
4: cB← nodes that block on community
5: if s and d are unreachable by T DFS then
6: return true, since nodes are already unreachable
7: else
8: remove nodes ∈ cB
9: if s and d are reachable by T DFS then
10: return false, since there is path between s and
d that is not blocked by community
11: add back all nodes, remove nodes ∈ cA
12: if nodes ∈ cB and d are reachable by T DFS then
13: return false, since blocking nodes can receive
advertisement without community
14: add back all nodes, remove nodes ∈ cR
15: if nodes ∈ cB and their respective nodes ∈ cA are
unreachable by T DFS then
16: return false, since communities are always re-
moved before reaching blocking nodes
17: Return true, if all above conditions fail
removes that community (line 14 to 16). (Recall here
that advertisements flow in the opposite direction of data
traffic.) If all these conditions are satisfied, then src
and dst are unreachable. If any of these conditions are
violated, the nodes are reachable. In Figure 4, EBGP→
ABGP→ DBGP violates condition (iii).
This algorithm can also verify P2 (“always waypoint-
ing”). After removing the waypoint, if src can reach dst,
then there is a path that can reach dst without traversing
the waypoint.
4.2 Tiramisu Hedge Min-cut
Another policy that does not require path enumeration
is P3 (reachable < K failures): here, operators want to
verify that the src can reach dst as long as there are < K
link failures. For this, ARC [6] computes the min-cut
for the src-dst graph, i.e., the minimum number of edges
whose removal can disconnect the graph. If min-cut is
≥ K, then P3 is satisfied.
Tiramisu uses a multilayer hedge graph abstraction.
Unfortunately, finding min-cuts in hedge graphs is a
known NP-hard problem [7]. Thus, to verify P3, we pro-
pose a new Integer Linear Program (ILP) to find hedge
graph min-cut, while also accounting for communities
and prohibited paths.
For this property, Tiramisu uses integer variables, sim-
ilar to Minesweeper [2]’s SMT encoding. However,
Tiramisu’s property-specific ILP encoding is simpler than
Minesweeper as it only adds integer and boolean vari-
ables relevant to hedge min-cut and avoids variables and
constraints associated with route selection, which signifi-
cantly reduces variables and constraints associated with
route advertisements. Minesweeper’s detailed encoding
exercises all of these variables in an attempt to compute
the actual path, which renders it slow even for a small
number of failures (K = 1).
Until now, the edges in our graphs represented the flow
of traffic from src to dst. For ease of understanding, in
specifying the ILP, we reverse the edges to represent the
flow of advertisement from dst to src. For brevity, we
explain the constraints at a high-level, leaving precise
definitions to Appendix C. Equation numbers below
refer to equations in Appendix C.
The objective of the ILP is to minimize the number of
physical link failures required to disconnect the src from
dst. Note that a single physical edge’s failure can cut
multiple Tiramisu graph edges. All such edges belonging
to hedge i will share the same Fi variable. Our objective
then is:
Objective: minimize ∑
i∈phyEdges
Fi (1)
Advertisement Constraints. We first discuss the con-
straints added to represent reachability of advertisements.
The base constraints state that the dst originates the ad-
vertisement (Eqn 4). To disconnect dst from src, the
advertisement must not reach the src (Eqn 5). For other
nodes, the constraint is that an advertisement reaches a
node if it gets propogated on any of its incoming edge
(Eqn 6).
Next, we discuss constraints on propogation of adver-
tisements. An advertisment can propogate through an
edge e, if it reaches the start node of the edge, the physi-
cal edge does not fail, the advertisement does not carry
a community that is blocked on this node, and if edge e
carries atleast one advertisement that does not create a
prohibited path. This is represented as shown in Eqn 7.
Communities. The base constraints state that each
node that adds a community forwards that community
and each node that removes that community does not
forward it further (Eqn 8 and Eqn 9).
For other nodes, we add the constraint that node n
forwards a community c iff any of its inbound neighbors
forwards that community to node n (Eqn 10).
Finally, we add the constraint that an edge e carries
a blocked community iff the start node of e forwards a
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community that is blocked by the end node of edge e
(Eqn 11).
Prohibited Path Constraints. An edge e, that only
propogates advertisements that create prohibited paths,
is an edge that satisfies the condition that start and end
nodes of e are untainted (uEdges) (Eqn 12). Also, the
start node receives advertisement only from untainted
neighbors and not from any other neighbor. Such edges
always create subpaths with three consecutive untainted
nodes (§3.1) (Eqn 12).
4.3 Tiramisu Longest path
Similar to cut-based properties, there are others that don’t
need path enumeration and can instead rely on custom-
crafted ILPs. These properties compute high-level at-
tributes of paths, such as bounds on length. An example
is the always bounded length policy (P4). For a given
K, P4 is true if under every failure scenario, traffic from
src to dst never traverses a path longer than K hops.
Enumerating all possible paths and finding their length
is infeasible. However, this policy can be verified effi-
ciently by viewing it as a variation of the longest path
problem: for a given K, P4 is true if the longest path
between src and dst in the graph is ≤ K.
ILP. Finding the longest path between two nodes in
a hedge graph is also NP hard [9]. To verify P4, we
propose another ILP whose objective is to maximize the
number of inter device edges (dEdges) traversed by an
advertisement (Ai). Note again that the path traversed by
the advertisement is the opposite of traffic flow. But both
have same path length. Notably, this ILP uses even fewer
constraints and variables compared to §4.2, and thus can
run even faster relative to Minesweeper.
Objective: maximize ∑
i∈dEdges
Ai (2)
Again, we elide detailed constraints to the Ap-
pendix D.
Single Path Constraints. We add constraints to en-
sure that only one path gets advertised, that the dst sends
the advertisement, and that the src receives it (Eqn 14
and Eqn 15).
For other nodes, we add the flow conservation property,
i.e. sum of incoming flows is equal to outgoing flows
(Eqn 16).
Advertisement Constraints. Finally, we add con-
straints on propogation of advertisements. Here, an ad-
vertisement can be blocked on edge e if carries a blocked
community or satisfies the prohibited path constraints
(Eqn 17).
5 Path specific policies
As opposed to the properties in the previous section, the
remaining properties that one may wish to verify require
knowing the exact path taken in the network. Consider
the policy that encodes a preference order among paths,
say, pre f Path = P1 >> P2 >> P3. This states that P1
should be taken by default; when path P1 fails, path P2
(if available) should be taken; and if P1 and P2 both fail,
then P3, if available, should be taken. A path, say P1,
can become unavailable for multiple reasons: (a) a router
configuration along P1 was updated to withdraw or filter
the route to the dst; (b) a link along P1 failed. In all cases,
we need to reason about what alternate paths materialize,
and whether the materialized path is indeed the path that
was meant to be taken. Simple graph traversal is thus
insufficient to verify this property. We need the actual
paths under various failure scenarios.
Griffin et al [8] observed that control plane protocols
essentially attempt to solve the stable paths problem.
Based on this, to compute paths, Minesweeper [2] mod-
els protocol interactions (advertisement generation/pro-
cessing, best path selection, etc) as an instance of the
stable paths problem. Furthermore, Griffin et al [8] pro-
posed the Simple Path Vector Protocol (SPVP) for ob-
taining a set of paths that form a solution to the stable
path problem.
Inspired by these two studies, we propose T PV P
(Tiramisu PVP), a protocol that can compute actual
network paths taken, while avoiding prohibited paths.
T PV P extends SPVP with rich messages and per-node
computation.
Whereas Minesweeper encodes the router’s path se-
lection actions based on SMT constraints, T PV P models
them using a protocol. Thus, Tiramisu emulates the exe-
cution of SPVP, whereas Minesweeper attempts to find
the SPVP output.
To find the path traversed by a specific traffic class,
Tiramisu runs T PV P on its traffic class-specific graph.
5.1 Tiramisu Path Vector Protocol
Advertisements. Similar to SPVP, for each node u, and
for each of its peer v, T PV P uses rib− in(u⇐ v) vari-
ables to keep track of the most recent route advertisement
received from v. Each advertisement consists of (i) a
path from the advertisement sender to the advertisement
source (dst of the traffic class), and (ii) the multi-metric
path cost to reach dst. Also, rib(u) represents the current
path (best advertisement and best path cost) to reach dst
from u.
Route Selection. In Minesweeper, the values of
rib− in were computed by applying import and export
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filters on these advertisements. In T PV P, these are re-
placed by an updateCost function. This function (i)
rejects prohibited paths (§3.1), (ii) rejects paths blocked
by communities (§4.1), and, (iii) computes the multi-
atrribute path cost to reach dst through v. Each node has
a choices function (⊕) that provides a partial order over
all rib− in(u⇐∗) paths. u then updates its rib(u) value
to the best choice/most preferred rib− in(u⇐∗).
rib− in also keeps track of the list of communities car-
ried by the advertisements, and the updateCost function
updates the community lists.
The updateCost and choices functions are closely
modeled based on the route import, route export and
route selection constraints of Minesweeper and SPVP.
These functions are either inferred from configuration or
based on standard conventions. E.g. choices could be
based on BGP selection policy (prefer highest local pre f ,
shortest ASPathlength etc), and, updateCost specifies
how to calculate the cost of rib− in(u⇐ v) as a function
of best(v) and edge weight ewu→v (add osp f costs, set
local pre f to ewu→v.l p etc).
Algorithm. Our final T PV P protocol is shown in Al-
gorithm 3. In the initial state, T PV P sets the rib value of
all nodes except dst to null (line 2). rib(dst) is set to ε ,
since it originates the advertisement (line 3). There are
three main steps in each iteration. First, for each node
u, T PV P computes all its rib− in values based on the
advertisement sent by its neighbors (line 6 to 8). If the
current rib(u)’s value is different from the best advertise-
ment, then T PV P updates rib(u) and sends a message to
all peers of node u (line 9 to 11). This message contains
the updated rib(u).
T PV P terminates when none of the nodes receive any
messages about the new rib− in values (line 12, 13).
This termination condition represents the converged state
of the newtork. Similar to SPVP, if network reaches a
converged state, then T PV P will find the best path to dst
for all nodes.
Theorem 2 Assuming the network control plane con-
verges, T PV P always finds the exact path taken in the
network under any given failure scenario.
We leverage correctness of Minesweeper and SPVP
to establish the correctness of T PV P as shown in Ap-
pendix B.2.
We return to the correctness of T DFS.
Theorem 3 T DFS traverse all real network paths that
could materialize under some failure scenario, and does
not traverse any path that cannot materialize on any
failure scenario.
Algorithm 3 Tiramisu Path Vector Protocol
Input:
G is the graph
dst is the destination node
1: procedure T PV P(G,dst)
2: set rib(i) values of all nodes i except dst to null
3: set rib(dst) to ε , since dst originates the advertisement
4: while true do
5: for each u ∈ G.nodes do
6: for each v ∈ peers(u) do
7: rib − in(u ⇐ v) =
updateCost(rib(v),ewu→v)
8: compute best(u) using choices([rib −
in(u⇐∗)])
9: if rib(u) is different from best(u) then
10: rib(u) = best(u)
11: send messages to all peers of node u
about change in rib(u)
12: if no node receives any messages then
13: break, since network has converged
We leverage the correctness of Theorem 1 and The-
orem 2 to prove correctness of Theorem 3 as shown
in Appendix B.3.
5.2 Tiramisu Yen’s algorithm
We return to determining how to verify the path prefer-
ence property introduced earlier in this section. We first
observe that there are similarities between analyzing path
preference (P5) and finding the k shortest paths in a graph
(the “k shortest paths problem” [18]). This is because, in
k shortest paths problem, the kth shortest path is taken
only when k−1 paths have failed. Enumeration for all
possible failures of all k−1 shorter paths is tedious. To
handle that, Yen [18] introduced a new algorithm to find
the k shortest paths. The algorithm uses dynamic pro-
gramming to avoid enumerating failures/link removals.
Next, we explain Yen’s algorithm in detail. Then, we pro-
pose TY EN (Algorithm 4), a simple extension to Yen’s
algorithm to verify P5. We show how in a simple fashion
TY EN uses Yen’s algorithm to verify P5.
Yen’s algorithm. Yen uses two lists: listA (keeps
track of the shortest path seen so far) and listB (keeps
track of candidates for the next shortest path). At the
start, Yen finds the first shortest path P (line 2) from src
to dst using any shortest path algorithm (e.g. Dijkstra’s).
Next, it takes every node n in path P (line 11, 12),
and finds the rootPath and spurPath of that node. The
rootPath of n is the subpath of P from src to node n (line
13). The spurPath is the shortest path from node n to dst
(line 18) that satisfies the following two conditions: i) the
path must not have any node from rootPath (line 17); ii)
the path must not traverse any outgoing edge e from n that
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is part of any of the previous k−1 shortest paths having
the same rootPath (line 15, 16). E.g. if A→ B→C→D
is the shortest path and A→ B is rootPath at node B, then
B→C→ E→ D spurPath is invalid.
Yen combines the rootPath and spurPath to form a
new path nP (line 19). nP is added to listB if it doesn’t
already exist in listA or listB (line 22). After traversing
all nodes of path P, Yen adds P to listA (line 24). Next,
Yen picks the shortest path from listB and reruns the
previous steps with this path as the new P. This continues
till Yen finds k paths.
Algorithm 4 Tiramisu Yen
Input:
G is the graph
src, dst are source and destination nodes
level is no. of path specified in path-preference policy
pre f Path, a map of preference level and path
1: procedure TY EN (G,src,dst, level)
2: P← path from src to dst returned by T PV P
3: P.level ← 1
4: P.eRemoved ← [], as best path requires no edge re-
moval
5: listA← [], tracks paths already considered as P
6: listB← [], tracks paths not yet considered
7: do
8: mostPre f ← most preferred path in pre f Path
whose edges don’t overlap with P.eRemoved
9: if P 6= mostPre f then
10: return false, since path preference is violated
11: for i← 0 to P.length - 1 do
12: sNode← ith node of P
13: rootPath← subpath of P from src to sNode
14: for each sp ∈ listA do . paths in listA
15: if sp has same rootPath at sNode then
16: remove outgoing edge of sNode in sp,
so that path sp is not considered . also remove other edges
that share the same hedge
17: remove all nodes and edges (hedge) of rootPath
except sNode to avoid loops
18: spurPath← path from sNode to dst returned
by T PV P
19: nP← rootPath + spurPath
20: nP.level← P.level+1
21: nP.eRemoved← all edges removed in this iter-
ation
22: add nP to end of listB if np is valid and np /∈
[listA, listB]
23: add back all nodes and edges to the graph
24: add P to listA
25: P← remove first path from listB
26: while P.level < K
27: return true, since loop didn’t find preference violation
Tiramisu Yen. The three failure modes highlighted at
the beginning of this section boil down to some specific
edges being removed from the Tiramisu graph, causing
the path in question to cease to exist. Given this, we make
a few modifications to Yen, resulting in an algorithm we
call TY EN, to work atop our multi-graph abstraction and
check for path preference; simply put, like Yen, we check
if P2 is the next path chosen after P1, and so on (line 8
to 10).
TY EN uses T PV P instead of Dijkstra to find the short-
est path. In addition, TY EN associates each path with
a variable, eRemoved. This keeps track of edges that
were removed to prefer this path (line 21). During each
iteration of P, TY EN identifies the most prefered path in
pathPre f that did not have an edge in P.eRemoved (line
8). If this path varies from P, then preference is violated
(line 9, 10).
Revisiting: Reachability < K with ACLs. The ILP
in §4.2 for P3 is not accurate when data plane ACLs
are in use. ACLs do not influence route advertisements.
Hence, routers can advertise routes for traffic that ends
up being blocked by ACLs. Recall that during graph
creation, Tiramisu removes edges that are blocked by
ACLs §3. This leads to incorrect mincut computation as
we show next:
Consider a src-dst traffic class in a network. Say there
are three network paths P1, P2 and P3 in increasing
order of cost that src learns of toward dst, and say P2
has a data plane ACL on it. Suppose further than all
three paths are edge disjoint. If a link failure removes
P1, the control plane would select path P2 to forward
to dst, but all packets from src are dropped at the ACL
on P2. In this case, a single link failure (that took down
P1) is sufficient to disconnect src and dst; that is, the
true mincut is 1. In contract, Tiramisu would remove
the offending ACL edge from the graph abstraction, and
since this preserves paths P1 and P3, Tiramisu would
conclude that the mincut is 2, which is incorrect.
We address this issue as follows. Nodes can become
unreachable when failures either disconnect the graph
or lead to a path with an ACL. Thus, we compute two
quantities: (1) L: How many minimum failures cause
the control plane to pick a path that first encounters a
blocking ACL? (2) N: How many minimum failures
cause disconnection in the Tiramisu graph with the ACL
edge removed (as originally proposed)? The true min-cut
value is min(L,N)?
Computing N in (2) is straightforward. For computing
L in (1), we first construct a graph without removing
edges for ACLs. Then, we run TY EN until we find the
first path with a dropping ACL on it. Say this was the Mth
shortest. Then, we use an ILP to compute the minimum
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% of Networks
Protocols/Modifiers University Datacenter Topology Zoo
eBGP 100% 100% 100%
iBGP 100% 0% 100%
OSPF 100% 97% 100%
Static routes 100% 100% 0%
ACLs 100% 100% 0%
Route Filters 100% 97% 100%
Local Prefs 50% 0% 100%
MPLS+VRF 100% 0% 0%
VLAN 100% 0% 0%
Community 100% 100% 100%
Table 2: Configuration constructs used in networks
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Figure 5: Size of multilayer graphs of all networks
number of edge failures L that will cause the previous
M−1 shortest paths to fail. If min(L,N)≥ K then P3 is
satisfied.
So far, we covered five properties to verify. But, using
the algorithms in this and the previous section as the
basis, Tiramisu can verify a variety of other properties
which Minesweeper can also verify. We list these, along
with how Tiramisu verifies them, in Appendix A.
6 Evaluation
Our implementation of Tiramisu is written in Java. We
use Batfish [5] to parse router configurations. From
these, we generate our multilayer graphs (§3). We im-
plemented all our verification algorithms (§4 and §5) in
Java. Tiramisu uses Gurobi [1] to solve our ILPs. In
all, this amounted to ≈ 7K lines of code. We evaluate
Tiramisu on a variety of issues:
• How quickly can Tiramisu verify different policies?
• How does Tiramisu perform relative to
Minesweeper [2]?
• How does Tiramisu’s performance scale with network
size?
All our experiments were performed on machines with
40 core 2.2 GHz Intel Xeon Silver Processors and 192
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Figure 6: Size of multilayer graphs of all networks
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GB RAM.
6.1 Network Characteristics
In our evaluation, we use configurations from (a) 4 uni-
versity networks, (b) 34 real datacenter networks oper-
ated by a large OSP, and, (c) 7 networks from topology
zoo dataset [12]. The university networks have 9 to
35 devices. The university networks are the richest in
terms of configurations constructs. They support eBGP,
iBGP, OSPF, Static routes, ACLs/Filters, community,
local preference, MPLS+VRFs and VLANs. The data-
center networks have between 2 and 24 devices. They do
not employ local preference, MPLS or VLANs. Finally,
the topology zoo networks have between 33 and 158 de-
vices. The configs for these networks were synthetically
generated using NetComplete [3]. These generated con-
figs do not have Static routes, ACLs, MPLS or VLANs
as Netcomplete cannot model them. Table 2 shows what
percentage of networks in these datasets support each
network protocol/modifier.
Figure 6 characterizes the size of all the multilayer
graphs generated by Tiramisu for these networks. It first
shows the number of nodes and edges used to represent
the base multigraph of these networks. We observe two
outliers in both Figure 6a and Figure 6b. These occur for
networks Uni−2 (24 devices) and Uni−3 (26 devices),
from the university dataset. These networks have multi-
ple VRFs and VLANs, and Tiramisu creates nodes (and
edges between these nodes) per VRF/VLAN per rout-
ing process. Note also that for the other networks, the
number of routing processes per device varies. Hence,
the number of nodes and edges do not monotonically
increase with network size.
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Figure 10: Speedup under all failures: Tiramisu vs Minesweeper (datacenter networks)
Policies. We consider five types of polices: (P1) al-
ways unreachable, (P2) always waypointing, (P3) always
reachable with < K failures, (P4) always bounded length,
and (P5) path preference. Recall from other sections:
P1 and P2 use T DFS; P5 uses T PV P and TY EN algo-
rithms; P3 uses ILP and TY EN.; And P4 uses another
ILP. Using these policies, we evaluate the performance
of all our algorithms.
6.2 Verification Efficiency
We examine how efficiently Tiramisu can construct and
verify these multilayer graphs. First, we evaluate the time
required to generate these graphs. We use configurations
from all the networks. Figure 7 shows the time taken
to generate the base graphs and per traffic class-specific
graph for all networks. Tiramisu can generate these
graphs, even for large networks, in ≈ 30 µs. The time
to generate the traffic-class graph from the base graph is
atmost 3 µs on average per traffic-class.
Next, we examine how efficiently Tiramisu can verify
various policies. Since the university networks are the
richest in terms of configuration constructs, we use them
in this experiment. Figure 8 shows the time taken to
verify policies P1, P3, P4, and P5. In this and all the
remaining experiments, the values shown are the median
taken over 100 runs for 100 different traffic classes. Error
bars represent the std. deviation.
We observe that P1 can be verified in less than 3 ms.
Since it uses a simple polynomial-time graph traversal
algorithm (T DFS), it is the fastest to verify among all
policies. The time taken to verify P5 is higher than P1,
because T PV P and TY EN algorithms are more complex,
as they run our path vector protocol to convergence to
find paths (and in TY EN’s case the protocol is invoked
many times). Finally, P3 and P4, both use an ILP and, as
expected, are slowest to verify. However, they can still
be verified in ≈ 80 ms per traffic class.
Although Uni2 and Uni3 have fewer devices than
Uni4, they have more nodes and edges in their Tiramisu
graphs (§6.1). Hence it takes longer to verify policies on
them.
6.3 Comparison with Minesweeper
Next, to put our performance results in perspective, we
compare Tiramisu with Minesweeper. In this experiment
we use the real datacenter networks. We consider policies
P1, P2, P4, and P5. In Minesweeper, we have to specify
the number of failures K; Minesweeper then verifies if
the policy holds as long as there are ≤ K failures. To
verify a property under all failure scenarios, we set the
value of K to number of physical links in the network - 1.
Figure 9 (a, b, c, and d) shows the time taken by Tiramisu
and Minesweeper to verify these policies. Figure 10 (a,
b, c, and d) shows the speedup provided by Tiramisu for
each of these policies.
For policies that use T DFS (P1 and P2), Tiramisu’s
speedup is as high as 600-800X . For P4, the speedup is
as high as 50X .
P5 is the only policy where speedup does not increases
with network size. This is because larger networks have
longer path lengths and more possible candidate paths.
Both of these affect the complexity of the TY EN al-
gorithm. The number of times TY EN invokes T PV P
increases significantly with network size. Hence the
speedup for P5 is relatively less, especially at larger net-
work sizes.
Note that since the number of nodes and edges did not
monotonically increase with network size (§6.1), the time
to verify these policies does not monotonically increase
either.
Next, we compare the performance of Tiramisu and
Mines- weeper for the same policies but without failures,
e.g. “currently reachable” instead of “always reachable”.
Tiramisu verifies these policies by generating the actual
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Figure 13: Performance on scale (topology zoo networks)
path using T PV P. Figure 11 (a, b, c, and d) shows the
speedup provided by Tiramisu for each of these policies.
Even for no failures, Tiramisu significantly outperforms
Minesweeper across all policies. Minesweeper has to
invoke the SMT solver to find a satisfying solution even
in this simple case.
To shed further light on Tiramisu’s benefits w.r.t.
Mineswe- eper, we compare the number of variables
used by Mineswee- per’s SMT encoding and Tiramisu’s
ILP encoding to verify P3 and P4. In this experiment,
we track reduction ratio, which is the number of vari-
ables in Minesweeper divided by number of variables
in Tiramisu. This is shown in Figure 12. As expected,
Tiramisu uses significantly fewer variables. Also, P3
uses more variables than P4. Hence it has a lower re-
duction ratio. Tiramisu uses integer variables only for
the aspects that matter towards the property in question,
where Minesweeper uses binary and integer variables
throughout its general encoding, irrespective of the prop-
erty in question. This is one reason for Minesweeper’s
poor performance.
6.4 Scalability
Until now, all our experiments were on small networks.
In this section, we evaluate Tiramisu’s performance on
large networks from the topology zoo. Figure 13 shows
the time taken to verify policies P1, P5, P3, and, P4.
Tiramisu can verify these policies in < 0.12 s, even in
these large networks.
As expected, verifying P1 (T DFS) is significantly
faster than all other policies, and it is very low across
all network sizes. However, for larger networks, time to
verify P5 (TY EN) is as high as P4. Again, this due to
larger networks having longer and more candidate paths.
Large networks also have high diversity in terms of path
lengths. Hence, we see more variance in the time to
verify P5 compared to other policies.
For large networks, the time to verify P3 is signifi-
cantly higher than other policies. This happens because
P3’s ILP formulation becomes more complex, in terms
of number of variables, for such large networks.
7 Related Work
We surveyed various related studies in detail, in earlier
sections. Here, we survey others that were not covered
earlier.
Aside from Minesweeper and ARC, there are other
control plane verification tools that attempt to verify
policies against various environments (failures or ad-
vertisements). ERA [4] symbolically represents con-
trol plane advertisements which it propagates through
a network and transforms it based on how routers are
configured. ERA is useful to verify reachability against
arbitrary external advertisements, but it does not have the
full coverage of control plane constructs as Tiramisu or
Minesweeper to analyze a range of policies. Bagpipe [16]
is similar in spirit to Minesweeper and Tiramisu, but it
only applies to a network that only runs BGP. FSR [15]
focuses on encoding BGP path preferences.
Batfish [5] and C-BGP [14] are control plane simula-
tors. They analyze the control plane’s path computation
as a function of a given environment, e.g., a given fail-
ure or an incoming advertisement, by conducting low
level message exchanges, emulating convergence, and
creating a concrete data plane. Tiramisu also conducts
simulations of the control plane; but, for certain poli-
cies, Tiramisu can explore multiple paths at once via
graph traversal and avoid protocol simulation. For other
policies, Tiramisu only simulates a simplified protocol
(SPVP) running over a multi-layer multi-attributed graph,
and the simulations are conducted in parallel per traffic
class.
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8 Limitations
One limitation of graph-based control plane models is
that they cannot symbolically model advertisements,
which is easier to do for SMT-based tools. Tiramisu
shares this drawback. This means that Tiramisu cannot
exhaustively explore if there exists an external adver-
tisement that could potential lead to a property viola-
tion; Tiramisu can only exhaustively explore link failures.
Tiramisu would have to be provided a concrete instanti-
ation of an advertisement; in such a case, Tiramisu can
analyze the network under the given advertisement and
determine if any policies can be violated.
A related issue is that Tiramisu cannot be applied to
verify control plane equivalence: Two control planes are
equivalent, if the behavior of the control planes (paths
computed) is the same under all advertisements and all
failure scenarios.
In essence, while Tiramisu can replace Minesweeper
for a vast number of policies, it is not a universal replace-
ment. Minesweeper’s SMT-encoding is useful to explore
advertisements.
9 Conclusion
While existing graph-based control plane abstractions are
fast, they are not as general. SMT-based abstractions are
general, but not fast. In this paper, we showed that graphs
can be used as the basis for general and fast network ver-
ification. Our insight is that, rich, multi-layered graphs,
coupled with algorithmic choices that are customized
per policy can help achieve the best of both worlds. Our
evaluation of a prototype (which we will release open
source) shows that we can offer 10-600X better speed
than state-of-the-art, scale gracefully with network size,
and model all key features found in network configura-
tions in the wild. This work does not raise any ethical
issues.
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A Other Policies
Some of the other policies that Tiramisu can verify are
listed below:
Always Chain of Waypoints (P6). Similar to way-
pointing, we remove nodes associated with each way-
point, one at a time. Using T DFS, we check if nodes
associated with one of the preceding waypoints in the
chain can reach nodes associated with one of the follow-
ing waypoints in the chain.
Equal Bound (P7). This policy checks that all paths
from src to dst are of the same length. The objective of
the ILP in §4.3 can be changed to find the shortest path
length. If the longest and shortest path length varies, then
this policy is violated.
Always isolated (P8). Two traffic classes are always
isolated if they never traverse the same link. ARC [6] ver-
ified this policy by checking if two traffic class-specific
graphs have any edge in common or not. Similarly, in
Tiramisu, we check if the two traffic class-specific graphs
have any hedge in common.
Multipath Consistency (P9). Multipath consistency
is violated when traffic is dropped along one path but
blocked by an ACL on another. To support multipaths
in T PV P, we change the best variable to track multiple
best advertisements. Using T PV P, Tiramisu can identify
the number of best paths. We run T PV P on graphs with
and without removing edges for ACLs. If the number of
paths varies with and without ACLs, then the policy is
violated.
Always no black holes (P10). Black holes occur
when traffic gets forwarded to a router that does not
have a valid forwarding entry. Blackholes are caused
by i) ACLs: router advertises routes for traffic that are
blocked by their ACLs; ii) static routes: the next-hop
router of a static route cannot reach dst. Tiramisu uses
T DFS to check these conditions. For (i) Tiramisu first
creates the graph without removing edges for ACLs. Let
R be the router with a blocking ACL. If src can reach
router R and R can reach dst (using T DFS), then traf-
fic will reach router R under some failure, and then get
dropped because of the ACL. For (ii) if src can reach the
router with static route and the next-hop router cannot
reach dst, then the traffic gets dropped.
B Proofs
B.1 Prohibited Paths
Any path with > 2 consecutive untainted nodes is a pro-
hibited path
Theorem 1 The approach specified in §3.1 correctly
identifies all prohibited path.
Proof: We will prove this by contradiction.
In a router, each routing process will have its own
Routing Information Base (RIB) that has routes learned
by that routing process. The routes of all RIBs are also
inserted in the Forwarding Information Base (FIB) of that
router. Hence, the “f” edge exists between all routing
process node and the fib node for each router.
The progression of taints is modelled based on GRIB
graph of [17]. In GRIB, edge adjacency exists only for
RIB adjacency. Similarly taints are spread only across
RIB adjacent processes. Similar to [17], taints cross
intra-device routing processes only with redistribution.
A prohibited path can exist only if you traverse a router
that does not have a valid fib entry. Assume such a path
exists and is not identified by Tiramisu’s tainting strategy.
Such paths have to satisfy the following three criterias: (i)
there has to be a router where path goes from tainted node
to untainted node, i.e. from node W representing routing
process or FIB (e.g. Cbgp, C f ib in Figure 3) that has
forwarding entry, to node X representing routing process
that does not have forwarding entry (Cosp f ); (ii) node
X has to be followed by a node Y (Dosp f ) representing
another router with the same routing process; and (iii)
node Y has to be succeeded by node Z which will either
be a node representing node Y ’s router’s FIB (D f ib) or
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another router with the same routing process as Y (Aosp f ).
Here both these nodes have to be untainted. However,
this ends up with a path with three untainted nodes, which
are classified by Tiramisu as prohibited. This contradicts
the assumption that this path is not identified by Tiramisu.
B.2 TPVP
Theorem 2 Assuming the network control plane con-
verges, T PV P always finds the exact path taken in the
network under any given failure scenario.
Proof: We leverage correctness of Minesweeper and
SPVP to establish the correctness of T PV P. In SPVP,
there is no restriction on order in which messages are
processed by different routers. As long as there exists
even one stable path, SPVP will find it irrespective of
the order of message processing. In T PV P (line 5), we
process messages in a fixed round-robin order. Since any
ordering of messages in SPVP leads to a valid solution,
a fixed ordering of messages should also lead to a valid
solution.
The body of the loop code of T PV P is equivalent to
SPVP. The updateCost function is a function that was
not mentioned in the original SPVP algorithm. In the
original SPVP algorithm, rib-in (u ⇐ v) represented
paths received from neighbor v. And the properties of
those paths e.g. local-pref, ospf-weight etc were assigned
based on import and export policies. Minesweeper also
modelled rib-in (u⇐ v) as import and export policy con-
straints. Tiramisu’s updateCost function also updates
path properties based on import and export policy con-
straints, similar to Minesweeper [2] and SPVP [8].
B.3 TDFS
Theorem 3 TDFS traverses all real network paths that
could materialize under some failure scenario, and does
not traverse any path that cannot materialize under any
failure scenario.
Proof: Let path P be the path traversed by a particular
src-dst pair in the actual network under some failure.
Now assume this path is not traversed by T DFS because
it does not exist in the graph. This contradicts Theorem 2,
which showed that T PV P always finds the exact path
used in the actual network, which implies the path must
exist in the graph. Thus, T DFS will traverse all network
paths that could materialize under some failure scenario.
Now assume there exists some path P′ in the actual
network that also exists in the graph. Also assume it is
not traversed by T DFS. This means this path P′ contains
three or more consecutive tainted nodes. This contradicts
Theorem 1 as it cannot be a real network path. Thus,
T DFS does not traverse any path that cannot materialize
under any failure scenario.
C Tiramisu Min-cut
Table 3 lists the boolean indicator variables and functions
used in encoding of the ILP for the property in §4.2. We
now provide the full ILP with detailed constraints; we
repeat the description of the constraints to ensure ease
of reading. Recall, edges in our graphs represented the
flow of traffic from src to dst. For ease of understanding,
in specifying the ILP, we reverse the edges to represent
flow of advertisement from dst to src.
Name Description
V
ar
ia
bl
e
Fe set as 1 if edge e fails
Ae set as 1 if advertisement propagates on edge e
Rn set as 1 if advertisement reaches node n
Be set as 1 if edge e carries blocked community
Pe set as 1 if edge e only propagates advertisement
that create prohibited paths
Cn,c set as 1 if node n forwards community c
Fu
nc
tio
n
nodes returns all nodes of graph
edges returns all edges of graph
dEdges returns all inter-device edges of graph
phyEdges returns all physical edges of graphs
uEdges returns all edges of graph with untaint start and
end nodes
oNodes returns all nodes except src and dst
iE(n) returns incoming edges of node n
oE(n) returns outgoing edges of node n
iUE(n) returns incoming edges from untainted neigh-
bors of node n
iN(n) returns start nodes of all incoming edges of
node n
ac(n) returns communities added by node n
rc(n) returns communities removed by node n
bc(n) returns communities blocked on node n
oc(n) returns communities /∈ [ac(n),bc(n),rc(n)]
start(e) returns start node of edge e
end(e) returns end node of edge e
Table 3: Variables and Functions
ILP The objective of the ILP is to minimize the num-
ber of physical link failures required to disconnect the
src from dst. All edges belonging to hedge i will share
the same Fi variable.
Objective: minimize ∑
i∈phyEdges
Fi (3)
Advertisement Constraints We first discuss the con-
straints added to represent reachability of advertisements.
The base constraints state that the dst originates the adver-
tisement. To disconnect dst from src, the advertisement
must not reach the src.
Rdst = 1 (4)
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Rsrc = 0 (5)
For other nodes, we add the constraint that advertise-
ment reaches n if it gets propagated (Ae) on any of its
incoming edge e.
∀n ∈ oNodes,Rn =
∨
e∈iE(n)
Ae (6)
Note that logical AND, OR operators can be repre-
sented as constraints in ILP.
Next, we discuss constraints on propagation of adver-
tisements. An advertisement can propagate through an
edge e, if it reaches the start node (n) of the edge (Rn), the
physical edge does not fail (¬Fe), the advertisement does
not carry a community (¬Be) that is blocked on this node,
and if edge e carries atleast one advertisement that does
not create a prohibited path (¬Pe). This is represented as
∀n ∈ oNodes,∀e ∈ iE(n) :
Ae = Rn∧¬Fe∧¬Be∧¬Pe (7)
Community Constraints The base constraints state
that each nodes that adds the community forwards that
community and each nodes that removes that community
does not forward it.
∀n ∈ nodes,∀c ∈ ac(n) :
Cn,c = 1 (8)
∀n ∈ nodes,∀c ∈ rc(n) :
Cn,c = 0 (9)
For other nodes, we add the constraint that node n
forwards a community c iff any of its inbound neighbors
(iN(n)) forwards that community to node n.
∀n ∈ nodes,∀c ∈ oc(n) :
Cn,c =
∨
i∈iN(n)
Ci,c (10)
Finally, we add the constraint that an edge e carries a
blocked community iff the start node of edge e forwards
any community that is blocked by end node of edge e.
∀e ∈ edges :
Be =
∨
c∈bc(end(e))
Cstart(e),c (11)
Prohibited Path Constraints An edge e, that only
propagates advertisements that create prohibited paths,
is an edge that satisfies the condition that (Eqn 12) the
start and end nodes of edge e are untainted (uEdges).
Furthermore the start node receives advertisement only
on edges from untainted neighbors (Aue) and not on edges
from any other neighbor (Ane). Such edges always create
subpaths with three consecutive untainted nodes.
∀e ∈ uEdges : Pe =
 ∨
ue∈iuE(start(e))
Aue
∧
¬
 ∨
ne∈¬iuE(start(e))
Ane
 (12)
D Tiramisu Longest Path
We now specify the ILP corresponding to §4.3 in detail.
For ease of reading, we also provide the full description
of the objective and the constraints.
Recall that to verify P4, we propose another ILP
whose objective is to maximize the number of inter de-
vice edges (dEdges) traversed by an advertisement (Ai).
Note again that, the path traversed by the advertisement
is the opposite of traffic flow. Our objective is as follows:
Objective: maximize ∑
i∈dEdges
Ai (13)
Single Path Constraints To ensure that only one path
gets advertised, and that the dst sends the advertisement
and the src receives the advertisement, we add the con-
straints in
∑
out∈outEdge(dst)
Aout = 1 (14)
∑
in∈inEdge(src)
Ain = 1 (15)
For other nodes, we add the flow conservation property,
i.e. sum of incoming flows is equal to outgoing flows
∀n ∈ oNodes : ∑
in∈iE(n)
Ain = ∑
out∈oE(n)
Aout (16)
Advertisement Constraints Next, we add constraints
on propagation of advertisements. An advertisement can
be bloc- ked on edge e if it satisfies the community (Be)
and path prohibition (Pe) constraints. These are similar
to Eqn 11 and Eqn 12.
∀e ∈ edges : Ae ≤ ¬(Be ∨ Pe) (17)
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